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INTRODUCTION
The United States government has "'moral obligations of the
highest responsibility"" to the four million American Indians' and
Alaska Natives residing in the United States. The federal govern-
ment, however, presently only honors its fiduciary duty to a portion of
the current Indian population.
Today, Native American tribes are divided into two categories:
those recognized by the federal government, and those not formally
"recognized" by the United States. Tribes that are federally recog-
nized receive the benefits and services exclusively reserved by the fed-
eral government for those classified as Indians. As a result of histori-
cal circumstances, nonrecognized tribes are excluded from federal
assistance because they have not maintained a formal relationship
with the United States. Denied their status as "Indians," members of
nonrecognized tribes have sought the assistance of the federal judici-
ary to compel the federal government to comply with its trust obliga-
tions to all Native Americans. Courts have struggled to decide
"whether and to what extent old promises should be honored" to In-
dian tribes, a question made more difficult when considered as to
tribes not recognized by the federal government.
I Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Seminole Na-
tion v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1972)).
2 Throughout this Comment, I will use the terms "Native American," "American
Indian," or "Indian" interchangeably. Although the politically correct term has been
"Native American," native people often refer to themselves as "Indians." See, e.g., About
NAP, Native Am. Rights Fund, at http://www.naxf.org/intro/index.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2003) (describing the Native American Rights Fund as a "non-profit organiza-
tion that provides legal representation and technical assistance to Indian tribes" (em-
phasis added)); see also VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN
MANIFESTO (1969) (using the term "Indian" throughout the book to refer to the abo-
riginal inhabitants of North America).
Stella U. Ogunwole, The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 2000
(2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbrO l-1 5.pdf,
4 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw 4 (1987).
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In Part I, I begin the analysis of federal recognition litigation by
examining the historical circumstances surrounding the category of
"1nonrecognized" tribes and outlining the economic and emotional
benefits associated with federal recognition. In Part I1, I discuss the
administrative process by which nonrecognized tribes may become
recognized and the specific hardships associated with the process. In
Part Ill, I examine the federal judiciary's response to the litigation ef-
forts of nonrecognized tribes. Although federal courts have perva-
sively used procedural barriers to judicial review in order to avoid
reaching the substantive claims of nonrecognized tribes, recent suc-
cessful mandamus suits suggest that there is hope for nonrecognized
tribal litigants.) Finally, in Part V, I discuss the possible extrajudicial
impact of the mandamus suits and their relevance to the future of
federal recognition litigation.
I. FEDERAL RECOGNITION
"Federal recognition" is the legal term of art used to identify those
Native American tribes with which the United States government ac-
knowledges a formal government-to-government relationship. Rec-
ognized tribes have access to the rights and privileges reserved exclu-
sively for Indians. Tribes that do not have an official relationship
with the United States are called "nonrecognized tribes." To appreci-
ate the particular social situation and legal struggles of nonrecognized
tribes, it is important to be familiar with the historical circumstances
which led to the creation of these categories and understand the
rights and benefits currently associated with recognized status.
A. The Historical Development of the Nonrecognized Indian Tribe
Nonrecognized tribes are tellingly referred to as the "forgotten
,,7,
people, 7 or "lost tribes."8 These tribes, however, were not simply over-
looked by federal officials. Instead, they were historically excluded
5 See infra, Part IlI.B (summarizing recent federal court victories by two nonrecog-
nized tribes seeking recognition by the United States).
6 See infra Part 1.B (surveying the federal benefits contingent on formal recogni-
tion of an Indian tribe by the United States government).
Frank W. Porter, III, An Historical Persective on Nonrecognized American Indian
Tribes, in NONRECOGNIZED AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE 1, 43 (Newberry Library Ctr. for the History of the Am. Indian, Occa-
sional Papers Series No. 7, 1983).
Susan D. Greenbaum, In Search of Lost Tribes: Anthropologo and the Federal Acknowl-
edgment Process, 44 HUM. ORG. 361, 362 (1985).
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from the federal-Indian relationship because: (1) they hid from
United States officials after being forced to leave their homelands; (2)
they were expressly excluded from Indian reorganization efforts in the
1930s; or (3) their relationship with the United States was expressly
terminated by legislative action.
1. Indian Removal
Prior to the 1830s, Native Americans inhabited land across the
continental United States. In 1830, President Jackson negotiated the
removal of eastern Indian tribes to lands west of the Mississippi River.'
Through force and coercion, eastern tribes were moved to reserva-
tions in Arkansas, Kansas, Illinois, and sometimes as far as the Okla-
homa Territory."' Known as the "Trail of Tears," the journey west
killed many Native Americans through exposure or just "plain heart-
break."" Although there was no explicit governmental action to re-
move Indians on the west coast, when gold and other valuable natural
resources were discovered, western tribes were likewise forced to leave
their homes and move onto reservations."12 At the time, the United
States government assumed that the majority of Native American fami-
lies would obey the federal removal effort and amicably displace
themselves to the reservations." Many Indians decided not to leave
their homes and hid instead.
Believing that "federal policies would be harmful to their
tribes ... [and] that [flederal agents were corrupt," these tribes de-
veloped communities where the natural conditions provided means of
shelter and distance from the outside world." A number of tribes
built villages on or near "swamps [or] barren lands" in order to avoid
9 See, e.g., A Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession and Limits, 7 Stat. 333, 333-34
(1830) (negotiating the relocation of the Choctaw Nation to lands west of the Missis-
sippi river).
0 See STEVEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE BASIC ACLU
GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 4 (2d ed. 1992) (describing the geographic
spread of the westward relocation of eastern Indian tribes).
11 ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 118 (1970).
12 See PEVAR, supra note 10, at 4 ("The discovery of gold in California in 1848
brought thousands of settlers to the West and increased the desire for Indian land.").
But cf, DEBO, supra note 11, at 119 (discussing the dire consequences for those
Creek Indians who did not remove with the rest of their tribe to Oklahoma).
14 See AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 465 (Comm. Print 1977)
(recounting that certain tribes chose hiding and isolation in the face of policies they
deemed harmful).
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contact with federal officials.' In a very real sense, "[s]ecrecy meant
survival" for these tribes. For them to have been identified by the
federal government as Native Americans "would have been for them
to die.
" 17
While in hiding, many of these tribes intermarried with other
races in the surrounding area. Intermarriage was necessitated by the
tribes' desire to remain hidden from the federal government, as well
as a way to compensate for the lack of available marriage 
partners.Is
Through intermarriage, these tribes were able to retain their Indian
customs while appearing as members of other races to governmental
officials. For instance, many California Indians were mistakenly iden-
tified as Mexicans by census takers.' ' Likewise, eastern Indians were
"perceived by Whites as mulattoes, mestizos, mixed-bloods, or tri-racial
isolates."" The federal government has often used the intermarriage
of Indian tribes as evidence of their assimilation into white culture. In
reality, intermarriage was an explicit survival tactic which allowed In-
dian tribes "to maintain their identity."2'
Whereas Indian tribes that hid from governmental entities made
an affirmative decision to sever their ties with the United States gov-
ernment, other tribes were explicitly denied the opportunity to form a
relationship with the United States during the Indian sovereignty ef-
forts of the 1930s.
2. The indian Reorganization Act
One of the most significant periods in federal-Indian policy began
with the 1934 passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)22 The
purpose of the IRA was to foster Indian self-sufficiency by rehabilitat-
15 Porter, sulpra note 7, at 23.
16 Id.
17 Federal Acknowledgment Process: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
96th Cong. 2 (1980) (statement of LaDonna Harris, President, Americans for Indian
Opportunity).
is See JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH-CENTURY
ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND AwR 297 (1988) (noting that the nonrecognized
Mashpee tribe intermarried with blacks due, in part, to "a relative shortage of men
among the Indians and of women among the blacks").
Charles W. Blackwell &J. Patrick Mehaffey, American Indians, Trust and Recogni-
tion, in NONRECOGNIZED AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 7, at 50, 62.
20 Porter, supIra note 7, at 7.
21 Id. at 24.
22 48 Star. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (2000)).
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ing their economic status and providing the opportunity to become
federally chartered corporations . From 1934 to 1953, Indian land
was returned, new land was purchased and developed as reservations,
and a ten-million-dollar revolving credit line was established for par-
ticipating tribes. 4
Though the purpose of the IRA was to provide federal assistance
to "Indian tribes" generally, many tribes were not asked to participate
in the reorganization efforts. While some tribes decided to "opt out"
of the IRA in order to escape federal supervision and surveillance,'
many were intentionally excluded.2' For example, one tribe was ex-
cluded because its members had "radios in their homes"; the federal
government reasoned that having radios in one's home suggested that
these people were "too civilized" to be legitimate Indians. 7 In the
end, ninety-nine tribes were organized under the IRA and ninety-six
Indian tribes were excluded.2 " All of the tribes that organized became
federally recognized tribes, and those that did not remained nonrec-
ognized tribes.
The 1930s and 1940s were a time of governmental support for In-
dian sovereignty. Federal policy, however, took a drastic turn in the
1950s when the federal government terminated its relationship with
hundreds of Indian tribes.
3. The Termination Period
Historically, treaty negotiations were the "accepted method" for
establishing a legal relationship between an Indian tribe and the
United States government: By signing a treaty, the United States
23 See I3EVAR, supra note 10, at 6 (observing that the IRA was designed to encour-
age tribal organization as federally chartered corporations).
24 See id. (recognizing the IRA's creation of a "revolving credit fund from which
loans could be made to incorporated tribes").
See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and ribal Members: The Ini-
pact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & Soc'N REV. 1123, 1133 (1994) (explaining
that some tribes selected out of the IRA "to escape its strictures").
211 See Indian Federal Acknowledgmeent Process: Hearing on H.R. 3430 Before the House
Comm. on Interior & lnsular Affairs, 102d Cong. 69 (1992) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
3430] (statement of Bud Shepard, Former Bureau of Indian Affairs Employee) (de-
claring that some tribes were deliberately ignored for failing to satisfy "some unwritten,
subjective criteria established within the [Bureau of Indian Affairs]").
27 Id.
29 Id. at 90 (statement of Ken Tollefison, Anthropologist, Seattle Pacific Univer-
sity).
2. PEVAR, suIpra note 10, at 37.
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recognized both the sovereignty of Indian tribes and the govern-
ment's responsibility to protect federal Indian land and provide
needed goods and services. Indian treaties provide the greatest legal
protection for tribal rights given that these "treaties have the same
force and effect as federal statutes," and thus "[a] violation of an In-
dian treaty is a violation of federal law."" Without a recognized treaty,
Indian tribes are vulnerable to the loss of sovereignty recognition and
federal services.
In 1953, Congress adopted House Concurrent Resolution 108,
which sought to end the provision of federal services and benefits to
Native Americans "at the earliest possible time." The federal gov-
ernment officially terminated its relationship with over one hundred
tribes and granted states extensive jurisdiction over Indian territo-
ries."3 Many tribes that were fortunate enough to have signed a treaty
with the United States suddenly found themselves unrecognized as
Native Americans. In California, for example, forty-one Indian tribes
had their relationship with the federal government terminated)
The historical background of nonrecognized tribes varies from
tribe to tribe and region to region. In addition to removal, the IRA,
and termination of federal assistance, colonial wars so weakened someS 3,5
groups that they were simply overlooked by United States officials.
Whatever the historical circumstances that led to their modern situa-
tion, all nonrecognized tribes are denied the federal rights, privileges,
protections, and status afforded federally recognized tribes.
B. Legal Privileges for "Indians"
Federal recognition provides three main advantages to Native
American tribes. The first is the federal government's acknowledg-
ment of Indian sovereignty. The second is the receipt of federal serv-
Id. at 37-43.
Id. at 43.
2 i. at 7.
33 See id. (describing Congress's termination of federal tribal assistance and, "[i]n
an effort to reduce federal responsibilities even further," its conferral of "full criminal
and some civil jurisdiction" over Indian reservations to designated states).
34 Rachael Paschal, Comment, The hnprimatur of Recognition: A meican Indian Tribes
and the Federal Acknowledgment Procem, 66 WASH. L. REV. 209, 214 (1991 ).
,i, See Porter, supra note 7, at 5 (indicating that some tribes, weakened and de-
populated by "dealing with colonial governments," were overlooked by federal officials
charged with "resolving the agreements that former European nations had made with
individual Indian tribes").
OLD PROMISES
ices and protections by eligible tribes. The final advantage is the pres-
tige and honor associated with federally recognized status.
1. Tribal Sovereignty
Recognition of tribal sovereignty is at the heart of the relationship
between federally recognized tribes and the United States govern-
ment. As "domestic dependant nations,"' federally recognized tribes
exert independent authority over their members. This allows feder-
ally recognized tribes to be exempted from the jurisdiction of state
governments. Tribal sovereignty encompasses the ability to form a
government, determine membership, control natural resources, en-37
force law and order, and regulate trade and commerce. Without
sovereignty rights, it is impossible for an Indian tribe to function as a
distinct governmental entity in a government-to-government relation-
ship with the United States.
Although the federal government acknowledges the sovereignty of
Indian tribes, it also acknowledges its own fiduciary responsibility to
assure that native tribes have the necessary resources to provide for
and protect their distinct cultural heritage. It is this recognition that
underlies the breadth of federal services provided to federally recog-
nized tribes.
2. Federal Services
Arguably the most important benefit associated with federal rec-
ognition is the Indian tribe's eligibility for federal services. These
services include "elementary, secondary, and post-secondary educa-
tion, social services, law enforcement, judicial courts, business loans,
land and heirship records, tribal government support, forestry, agri-
culture and range lands development, water resources, fish, wildlife
and parks, roads, housing, adult and juvenile detention facilities, and
irrigation and power systems." ' Of this vast array of federal resources,
educational assistance, economic support, and legal representation
provide the most needed services to Indian peoples.
36 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
37 See PEVAR, supra note 10, at 82 (enumerating these as the "most important areas
of tribal authority").
38 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (2001) (on file with author).
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a. Education
The United States has a long history of providing educational as-
sistance to Native Americans. Educational services are provided by a
number of federal bureaucracies, including the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs and the Department of Education: In 1992, $ 39.4 million of
federal support was made available exclusively to Indian college stu-
dents in the form of scholarships and grants."' Although these pro-
grams were drafted to provide services for "Native Americans" (with-
out defining the term), the development of federal recognition has
led many programs to limit their services to those tribes formally rec-
ognized by the federal government. For example, university and col-
lege admissions officers have required proof of Indian status before
considering a student for educational programs or special considera-
tion.' If an individual comes from a nonrecognized tribe, she has no
means of satisfying such documentation requirements. As a result,
these programs are only available to federally recognized Indians.
Educational support for secondary education provides meaningful
opportunities for Native Americans who have a formal relationship
with the United States. Educational assistance, however, is only one of
many types of federal service provided to members of federally recog-
nized tribes. Economic support is another area of federal assistance
that is vital to Indian communities.
b. Economic support
Economic support for recognized Indian tribes is provided in two
ways: federal loans and gaming privileges. Federal loans provide Na-
tive Americans needed access to funds for community improvement.
When federal loans are not enough, gaming privileges help to aug-
ment the financial needs of Indian tribes.
One of the more important outcomes of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act was the establishment of revolving credit lines for American
39 See PEVAR, supra note 10, at 268-71 (listing federal administrative bodies that
provide Indians with services, and describing the educational programs administered
by state and federal governments).
-1 Angela Gonzales, The (Re)Articulation of American Indian Identity: Maintaining
Boundaries and Regulating Access to Ethnically Tied Resources, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE &
RES. I. 199, 213-14 (1998).
The adnissions office of the University of California, Los Angeles, for example,
requires that all "American Indian, Alaskan Native, and Native Hawaiian graduate stu-
dents . . . provide documentation of status" when applying as Native Americans. Id. at
214.
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Indians. 2 Coupled with the Oklahoma Welfare Act,4" the federal gov-
ernment established a revolving credit line totaling twelve million dol-
44lars by 1936 for recently incorporated tribal communities.
The second, and more controversial, economic benefit available
to recognized tribes is a limited exemption from state gaming laws.
With the passage of the 1988 Indian Gaming Act,4 r tribes are permit-
ted to use gaming for economic advancement.4" The most well-known
case of economic growth via gaming privileges is that of the Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe of Connecticut. With the success of their casino,
47Foxwoods, the Mashantucket Pequot tribe now has the means to ac-
quire extensive amounts of land in the state of Connecticut, illustrat-
ing one potential advantage of this particular economic benefit for
recognized tribes. The controversy over gaming rights has cast a
shadow over federal recognition, though, causing many government
and tribal officials to question whether the petitioning tribe is seeking
recognition of their Indian heritage, or simply seeking economic
48
gain.
c. Legal protection
The third significant benefit of federal recognition is the legal
protection of the federal government. As a result of the government's
trust obligation to Native Americans, the United States has a "duty of
42 Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 10, 48 Stat. 984, 986 (1934) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 470 (2000)).
43 Pub. L. No. 74-816, 49 Stat. 1967 (1936) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
501-509 (2000)).
44 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 246 (1942).
45 Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 2, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
2701-2721 (2000)).
46 See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2000) ("Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regu-
late gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited
by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal
law and public policy, prohibit such gaining activity.").
t7 SeeJEFF BENEDICT, WITHOUT RESERVATION: THE MAKING OF AMERICA's MOST
POWETRFUL INDIAN TRIBE AND FOXWOODS, THE WORLD's LARGEST CASINO 226-28
(2000) (discussing the immediate success of the Foxwoods casino and the one million
annual salary of the casino's director).
48 See Federal Recognition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong.
55 (2000) (statement of Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, Department
of the Interior) [hereinafter Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs] (voicing his
concern with the "financial backing" of some tribes seeking federal recognition and
the large amounts of gambling revenue at stake in the process, both of which "ob-
scure ... the truth" of tribal recognition and make the administrative process more
difficult).
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protection" toward Indians which encompasses legal representation." '
Generally, "most of the major court battles over Indian rights to water,
land, and wildlife, have been brought by the United States on behalf
of... Indian tribe[s]."" The United States government takes an ac-
tive role in protecting the rights of Indian groups with whom they
have an established government-to-government relationship.
Educational, economic, and legal assistance are the primary re-
sources provided to federally recognized tribes. These services are
denied to nonrecognized tribes on the assumption that these tribes
are not "legitimately" Indian.5' This belief has influenced not only the
way federal bureaucracies view nonrecognized tribes, but also how
nonrecognized tribes perceive themselves.
3. Prestige and Honor
The term "federally recognized tribe" has become synonymous
with "true" Indian heritage. As a result, "nonrecognized tribe" has
become associated with the "[s]tigma of second class Indian."'0  The
widespread belief is that if an individual is not recognized, she "can-
"it See PEVAR, supra note 10, at 26-27 (stating that "[t]he federal government's obli-
gation to... fulfill its treaty commitments is known as its trust responsibility," and noting
that this trust responsibility was extended to federal statutes, implied obligations, and
loyalty by the federal government).
5(f Id. at 289.
51 See infra Part III.B.3 (explaining the recognition process's bias in favor of an un-
realistic conception of "ideal" tribal identity).
5 This association may be a result of the legislative narrowing of the term "Indian"
in federal statutes. Although these statutes were intended for "Indians" generally, they
have been interpreted in recent years to only include federally recognized tribes.
Many current statutes define "Indian" by reference to the (somewhat elliptical) tribal
definition provided by the 1975 Indian Self-Determination Act: "'Indian tribe' means
any Indian tribe ... which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and serv-
ices provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians." 25
U.S.C. § 450b(e) (2000); see Indian Financing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1452(b)-(c) (2000) (de-
lining "Indian" and "Tribe"); Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1603(c)-(d) (2000) (same); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (2000) (de-
fining "Indian tribe"); Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2403(3) (2000) (same); Tribally-Controlled Schools Act, 25 U.S.C. §
2511(2) (2000) (same); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25
U.S.C. § 3001(7) (2000) (same).
53 Federal Acknowledgment IProcess: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
96th Cong. 7 (1980) (statement of LaDonna Harris, President, Americans for Indian
Opportunity).
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not be Indian.",4 Nonrecognized tribes frequently pursue recognition
for the "prestige and honor in establishing the government-to-
government relationship with the United States.""" As Charles Black-
well and J. Patrick Mehaffey explain, "For these people, acknowledg-
ment is an affirmation of [their] heritage and official recognition of
their tribal ancestry: an expression of their Indian pride.'
Federal recognition affords those who possess it jurisdiction over
their peoples, access to an extensive list of federal services, and valida-
tion of their inherent Indian identity. Nonrecognized tribes lack the
authority, the resources, and the status to truly claim their Indian
heritage. It was this understanding of the plight of nonrecognized
Indian tribes that led Congress in the 1970s to investigate the histori-
cal and contemporary situation of nonrecognized tribes and suggest
legal mechanisms by which nonrecognized tribes could become fed-
erally recognized.
II. THE FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS
In 1975, Congress established the American Indian Policy Review
Commission (AIPRC) to survey the current status of Native Americans
within the continental United States. Task Force Ten of the AIPRC
specifically investigated the situation of terminated and nonrecog-
nized tribes." After two years of intensive investigation, Task Force
Ten found that the "results of 'nonrecognition' upon Indian commu-
nities and individuals have been devastating."' The Task Force rec-
ommended that clear procedures be enacted to provide "a candle in
the darkness of confusion and neglect which surround terminated
and nonfederally recognized American Indian people."'"" It was the
Task Force's intention that these procedures would expressly end the
54 Indian Federal Acknowledgment Process: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Interior &
Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. 156 (1992) (statement of Bud Shepard, Former Bureau of
Indian Affairs Employee).
55 Blackwell & Mehaffey, supra note 19, at 56.
Id.
57 Paschal, supra note 34, at 212.
58 TASK FORCE TEN: TERMINATED AND NONFEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIANS,
REPORT ON TERMINNI'ED AND NONFEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIANS: FINAL REPORT 1O
THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REvIEW COMMISSION 3 (1976).
59 Id. at 1695.
60 Id. at 4.
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practice of categorizing Native American tribes as federally recognized
or nonrecognized. ' '
In response to AIPRC recommendations and congressional ap-
proval of the Commission's suggestions, the Department of the Inte-
rior (DOI or the Department) sought to establish a uniform proce-
dure for the recognition of previously nonrecognized tribes.2 In
1978, the DOI, pursuant to its congressional authority,'3' established an
administrative mechanism by which nonrecognized tribes could be-
come eligible for federal services and legal protections.' Also known
as the Federal Acknowledgment Process (FAP), the express purpose
of this regulation '15 was to "establish a departmental procedure and
policy for acknowledging that certain American Indian groups exist as
tribes. '"'3 The DOI's procedure for becoming federally recognized en-
tails extensive documentation and proof of legitimate Indian status,
which in reality creates further difficulties for nonrecognized tribes
rather than provide a means for recognition of all Indian tribes.
A. Meeting the Criteria
To begin the process of federal acknowledgment, Indian petition-
ers must provide a letter of intent.7 Next, the Indian tribe gathers the
61 See id. at 1698 ("[T]he statutes do not authorize the [federal recognition] dis-
tinction. The [Terminated and Nonfederally Recognized Indians Task Force] con-
cludes that 'non-federally recognized' should not be used in any official way and
should be rendered harmless.").
62 See Mark D. Myers, Federal Rerognition of Indian Tibes in the United States, 12 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 271, 273 (2001) (noting that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
"'raced to draft [these] administrative guidelines"' in order to preempt congressional
action (quoting Peter Beinart, Lost 7ibes: Native Americans and Government Anthropoto-
gists Feud over Indian Identity, LINGUA FRANCA, May/June 1999, at 33)).
'3 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2000) (granting the Executive branch the "management of
all Indian affairs" and the authority to "prescribe such regulations as [the Presi-
dent] ... think[s] fit for carrying into effect the variotIs provisions of any act relating
to Indian affairs").
64 Procedures for Establishing That an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian
Tribe, 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2002).
(5 It is important to note that the FAP is a regulatory, rather than statutory regime,
and that Congress has not developed its own mechanism for Indian acknowledgment.
66 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (2002). There are currently 562 federally recognized Indian
tribes in the United States. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,328 (July 12,
2002) ("562 tribal entities [are] recognized and eligible for funding and services ... by
virtue of their status as Indian tribes.").
See 25 C.F.R. § 83.4(a) (2002) ("Any Indian group ... that believes it should be
acknowledged as an Indian tribe ... may submit a letter of intent.").
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required documentation to establish its eligibility for federal acknowl-
edgment. DOI regulations require that the putative tribe submit
documentation to satisfy all of the following criteria:
(a) The petitioner has been identified as an American Indian entity on
a substantially continuous basis since 1900.
(b) A predominant portion of the petitioning group comprises a dis-
tinct community and has existed as a community from historical times
until the present.
(c) The petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over
its members as an autonomous entity from historical times until the pre-
sent.
(d) A copy of the group's present governing document .... [T] he peti-
tioner must provide a statement describing in full its membership crite-
ria and current governing procedures.
(e) The petitioner's membership consists of individuals who descend
from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes which
combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity.
(f) The membership of the petitioning group is composed principally of
persons who are not members of any acknowledged North American In-
dian tribe.
(g) Neither the petitioner nor its members are the subject of congres-
sional legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal
relationship.
Once the petition is complete, the tribe submits it to the DOI for re-
view. If the petition includes all the required information, the Secre-
tary of the Interior will place the tribe on "active consideration" and
issue proposed findings within one year as to whether the Indian tribe
should be federally recognized.'" Once a tribe is recognized, it be-
comes "eligible for the services and benefits.., that are available to
other federally recognized tribes" and "shall be entitled to the privi-
leges and immunities available to other federally recognized historic
tribes by virtue of their government-to-government relationship with
the United States. ': ' As written, the federal procedures for acknowl-
68 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2002).
69 25 C.F.R. § 83.10 (2002). However, the BIA typically takes much longer to de-
cide petitions. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, supra note 48, at 57
(statement by Richard Velky, Chairman of the Schaghticoke Nation) (arguing that it
may take the BIA ten to twelve years to reach a final determination of tribal status); see
also Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2000) (estimating that it
will take the DOI twenty years to review the plaintiff tribe's petition).
70 25 C.F.R. § 83.12(a) (2002).
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edgment appear to provide a reasonable and clear means of deter-
mining which Indian tribes should become federally recognized.
However, the neutral language of the regulations conceals the harsh
realities faced by nonrecognized petitioners.
I
B. Hardships for Nonrecognized Tribes
The express purpose of developing a uniform means of recogniz-
ing American Indians was to provide a relatively easy and straightfor-
ward neans for nonrecognized tribes to establish a federal-Indian re-
lationship. In fact, however, the adoption of the FAP has caused
further pain and suffering to an already weak and neglected portion
of the Indian community. Specifically, nonrecognized tribes face
large financial, emotional, and cultural costs when attempting to navi-
gate the FAP.
1. Time and Money
While the regulatory procedures for federal recognition may ap-
pear straightforward, the actual task of compiling the petition requires
considerable amounts of time and money. The creation of the docu-
ments alone has been estimated to take between two-and-a-half and
five years.7' During this time, the tribe must hire an array of experts:
anthropologists to validate the existence of a current tribal commu-
nity, genealogists to trace tribal ancestry, and lawyers to oversee the
process.72 These professionals are required to substantiate the tribe's
fulfillment of the FAP criteria. On average, tribes have paid between
$300,000 and $500,000 for the creation of their petition. Some peti-
tioners have paid more than a million dollars for their documenta-
tion.7 Although some private and public organizations help to pro-
vide funding,7' for the most part, the expenses are borne by the tribes
themselves.7t
71 Blackwell & Mehaffey, supra note 19, at 59. In fact, this may be a conservative
estimate. Cf United States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194 (D. Conn.
1999) (noting that it took the plaintiff tribe sixteen years to complete its application).
72 Paschal, supra note 34, at 216-17.
73 Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes: Hearing on H.R, 2549, H.R. 4462, and H.R.
4709 Before the Subcomm. on Native Am. Affairs of the House Comm. on Natural Res., 103d
Cong. 167 (1994) [hereinafter, Hearing on Federal Regulation ofIndian Tibes] (statement
of Bud Shepard, former BIA employee and one of the original drafters of the federal
regulations).
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., James v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 824 F.2d 1132, 1134 (D.C.
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The length of time the DOI takes to review a petition can have
disastrous effects on the tribe's ability to document and prove its In-
dian ancestry. During the FAP process, important tribal leaders may
die who may have been able to provide necessary first-hand informa-
tion to federal investigators. Richard Velky, Chief of the Schaghticoke
Tribal Nation, has noted that during his tribe's involvement in the
FAP, "several elders" have died who "were an important link to the
history, community, governance and culture of Schaghticoke for the
first half of the 20th century. ,77
2. Emotional Costs
In addition to the consequences of time and money, there are
significant emotional costs associated with revealing tribal members'
personal stories and the community's history to a federal agency.
Many Native Americans, just as most people, desire to keep their pri-
vate and personal affairs protected from public scrutiny. Unfortu-
nately, the FAP does not grant Native Americans discretion in reveal-
ing their most intimate familial relationships and cultural practices.
For some tribes, such as the Piro/Manso/Tiwa Tribe, disclosing in-
formation about their community life violates their traditions and re-
suits in considerable emotional loss when this information is revealed
to individuals outside the tribe."' During the FAP process, "unrecog-
nized tribes are ... asked to document very personal, private, sacred,
[and] painful" information which could involve "family memories and
information about deceased individuals which ... include memories
of abuse, abandonment, or other family problems.
'
,
7
9
When Indian familial relationships are scrutinized by the federal
government they are not only compared to notions of "normal"
American family relations, but more importantly, are analyzed against
notions of the "proper" Indian family life. This latter idealization of
Cir. 1987) (noting that the nonrecognized tribe from the Department of Health and
Human Services provided two grants totaling approximately $175,000 to a nonrecog-
nized tribe).
76 See Hearing on Federal Regulation of Indian Tribes, supra note 73, at 231 (reproduc-
ing a letter from Margaret Greene, Samish Indian Tribe, to Rep. Bill Richardson,
Chairman, House Subcomm. on Native Am. Affairs 1 (Aug. 3, 1994), stating that the
tribe paid for most of the expenses incurred in its recognition application process).
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, supra note 48, at 86 (statement of
Richard L. Velky, Chief, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation).
78 Id. at 59 (statement of Louis Roybal, Governor, Piro/Manso/Tiwa Tribe).
79 Id. at 89.
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Indian communities has resulted in another layer of problems associ-
ated with the FAP for nonrecognized tribes.
3. The Ideal Tribe
In addition to creating difficulties of time, money, and emotional
costs, the FAP conceptually requires proof of an "ideal tribe," rather
than identifying the current, realistic characteristics of Native Ameri-
can life."') One of the leading assumptions of the federal regulations
"is that tribal identity is innate: that a tribe develops as an organic en-
tity, taking its shape from internal forces rather than from external
forces.""' This assumption has allowed many tribes that predate Euro-
pean contact to remain nonrecognized . The regulations do not re-
flect a cultural and historical understanding of the current nature of
American Indian tribes. As such, the criteria function not to increase
the number of Indians benefiting from the federal-Indian relation-
ship, but rather to "deny... Indian groups official recognition...
thereby limit[ing] their access to federal services."
8 3
The AIPRC's intent in researching and recommending formal
procedures for Indian recognition was to alleviate the hardships suf-
fered by nonrecognized tribes. The FAP was meant to provide such a
streamlined approach. In reality, the FAP has created new problems
for nonrecognized tribes by requiring them to pay exorbitant amounts
of money over long periods of time and to reveal painful community
histories, which likely cannot live up the image of the "proper" Indian
tribe. Recognizing the injustices associated with the FAP, many In-
dian tribes, their advocates, and their legal counsel turned to the fed-
eral courts for assistance. Because the FAP was developed only in
1979, the federal judiciary was faced in 1993 with a matter of first im-
pression: to what extent would the court honor and enforce promises
made to nonrecognized Indian tribes against the power and authority
delegated to the DOI?
80 See Dan Gunter, The Technology of Tribalism: The Lemhi Indians, Federal Recogni-
tion, and the Creation of 7ibal Identity, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 85, 89 (1998) ("In short, the
[federal] recognition criteria assume an 'ideal tribe.' . . . A putative tribe that lacks
[these ideal characteristics] may well fail to earn federal recognition.").
81 Id. at 88.
82 See Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at
the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 302 (2001) (noting that 25
C.F.R. § 83 continues to leave many tribes that existed prior to the sixteenth century
unrecognized by the federal government).
83 Gunter, sup/ra note 80, at 98.
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III. LEGAL ACTIONS FOR NONRECOGNIZED TRIBES
Nonrecognized tribes and their counsel went to court hopeful
that judicial action would provide relief from the historical and bu-
reaucratic hardships they have faced for two hundred years. Optimis-
tic that judicial inquiry would provide the necessary "outside force" to
compel change within the DOI, a number of nonrecognized tribes
filed suit against the Department.
A. Judicial Deference to the Department of the Interior
For the first twenty years of litigation on the FAP, nonrecognized
tribes challenged the DOI's power to recognize Indian tribes. Either
by directly attacking the legal grounds upon which the DOI promul-
gated the federal regulations, or seeking direct federal recognition
from the judiciary, nonrecognized tribes asked the courts to focus on
matters of substantive, rather than procedural fairness.
1. Direct Attacks on DOI Authority and Decision Making
Two tribes directly challenged the DOI's authority to deny federal
recognition of an Indian tribe, the Miami and United Houma Na-
tions. Both tribes asked the courts to consider the particular merits of
their claims; in both cases, the federal judiciary avoided the substan-
tive claims of these nonrecognized tribes through complete deference
to the DOI's regulatory decision-making authority. By turning a blind
eye to the contemporary plight of nonrecognized tribes, the courts as-
sured that old promises would not be kept to these historical tribes.
a. The Miami Nation
The aboriginal lands of the Miami Nation are located in Peru, In-
diana, and "[b]etween 1795 and 1840, the Miamis entered into a
number of treaties with the United States, ceding millions of acres of
land. ' ' 4 The final treaty between the tribe and the United States gov-
ernment relinquished "'all of [the Tribe's] remaining lands in Indi-
ana,"' provided that within five years the Miami Nation remove from
Indiana to an area in east-central Kansas.' Like many nonrecognized
tribes, however, only half of the tribe left their historical tribal land, in
84 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. Lujan ("Miami Nation I"), 832 F.
Supp. 253, 253 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
85 Id. (quoting the Treaty of November 28, 1840, 7 Stat. 582).
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this case moving to the Kansas territory."" The Miami Indians who
remained in Indiana were given individual land grants on the Mesh-
ingomesia Reserve. 7 As "Indian Country, '8 the Meshingomesia Re-
serve was exempt from Indiana state tax laws." '" Nevertheless, in the
1880s, Indiana levied property taxes against individual Miami resi-
dents.!' In 1885, the Miami tribe filed a lawsuit against the State and
the court found individual tribe members exempt from personal
property taxes. When the Miami Nation approached the DOI to re-
cover their paid taxes, the Assistant Attorney General determined that
the Miami Nation was no longer a tribal organization and was not pro-
tected by the federal trust relationship. ' Since that decision the DOI
has refused to acknowledge the Miami Nation as an Indian tribe leav-
ing them vulnerable to the historical and contemporary costs associ-
ated with nonrecognition.
In their first suit, the Miami Nation argued that the decision to
withdraw federal recognition was ultra vires because only Congress has
the power to terminate federal-tribal relations.1' Rather than examine
the substantive argument advanced by the Miami Nation, the Indiana
federal court determined that the suit was barred by the statute of
limitations."' By focusing on the statute of the limitations, the court
was able to avoid an inquiry into the DOI's failure to abide by its trust
obligations to the Miami Nation.
The Miami Nation returned to federal court two years later chal-
lenging both the authority of the DOI to promulgate the regulations
and the validity of the regulations themselves' The Miami Nation ar-
86 Id. at 254.
87 Id.
88 "Indian Country" refers to "all the land under the supervision of the United
States government that has been set aside primarily for the use of Indians." PEvAR,
supra note 10, at 16. Generally speaking "state jurisdiction does not extend to Indian
Country," and "most crimes by Indians within Indian Country are governed by tribal or
federal and not state law." Id. at 16.
S9 Miami Nation 1, 832 F. Supp. at 254 (citing Wau-Pe-Man-Qua v. Aldrich, 28 F.
489, 493 (C.C.D. Ind. 1886)).
90 Id.
Wau-Pe-Man-Qua, 28 F. at 494.
9'2 Miami Nation I, 832 F. Supp. at 255.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 256-57; see 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000) ("Every claim of which the United
States has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition therein is filed within six
years after such claim first accrues.").
95 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. Babbitt ("Miami Nation II"), 887 F.
Stipp. 1158, 1161 (N.D. had. 1995).
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gued that the DOI exceeded its authority by issuing regulations that
imposed stricter requirements on tribes petitioning after 1978."' Also,
the Miami Nation contended that the regulations were invalid because
they "fail[ed] to define key terms" and the appropriate "burden of
proof," and "provide[d] no mechanism for independent review or
administrative appeal."'7
The court began its analysis of the Miami Nation's claims by de-
termining the appropriate standard of review under the Chevron doc-
trine. Citing previous litigation involving the federal recognition
question,' the court found the regulations to be legislative,'00 rather
than interpretative,"" triggering Chevron deference."12  Though the
court agreed that the term "Indian tribe" was not affirmatively defined
by Congress, °3 following the Chevron doctrine, it determined that
when "the grant of authority [is] implicit rather than explicit, the
court 'may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency."' The court was equally unsympathetic to the Miamis'
claims against the regulations for federal recognition. The court
found that the regulations were not arbitrary and capricious "simply
because the Miamis contend that a few terms are vague or because the
burden of proof is unclear."' '  In addition, Congress had not in-
96 Id. at 1162.
97 Id.
98 Under the Chevron doctrine, when a court reviews an administrative agency's
construction of a statute, it must inquire "whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If congressional intent is clear, the court must give effect to the
expressed desire of Congress. If the legislative intent is ambiguous, the court must de-
termine "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute." Id. at 843.
99 SeeJames v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 824 F.2d 1132, 1137
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services's authority
to promulgate Procedures for Establishing That an American Indian Group Exists as
an Indian Tribe, 25 C.F.R. § 83.2, is consistent with her authority under 25 U.S.C. §§ 2,
9).
00 Legislative regulations are legally binding and must conform to the specific
authority of the administrative agencies' enabling act. WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H.
SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ExAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 137 (2001).
0I Interpretative rules interpret existing law and do not carry independent legal
effect. Id. at 149.
102 Miami Nation 11, 887 F. Supp. at 1165.
103 Id. at 1165-66.
104 Id. at 1167 (quoting Chevron, 247 U.S. at 844).
105 Id. at 1173. Note that courts have found the lack of a formal hearing violative
of a tribe's right to procedural due process if the tribe can demonstrate that it received
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tended "to require a [formal] hearing and opportunity for cross-
examination" given that the federal acknowledgment procedures
"were promulgated tinder the informal rulemaking procedure'" of
the Administrative Procedures Act. ' 7 By focusing on Chevron defer-
ence, the court was able to affirm the DOI's process for recognition
without inquiring into the actual fairness of the FAP itself. The Chev-
ron doctrine, therefore, allowed the court to avoid the real question of
whether the federal government had honored its trust responsibilities
to the Miami Nation.
In its final attempt to challenge the DOI's judgment that it was
not a federally recognized tribe, the Miami Nation argued: (1) the
DOI had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that the Miami
Nation did not meet the qualifications of a historic tribe;"" (2) the
Miami Nation was entitled to a reevaluation under the current revised
regulations; and (3) recent amendments to the Indian Reorganization
Act (IRA) restored the Miami Nation's federal status. " '
After reviewing the DOI's findings, the court found that unless the
decision was premised on factors not intended by Congress or was im-
plausible in light of the evidence, it was not arbitrary and capricious."(
The court also discounted assertions that the DOI had acted arbitrar-
ily and capriciously in its dealings with the Miarni Nation.''' Finally,
the court determined that the Miamis were not entitled to a rehearing
on their tribal status due to the 1994 amendments of the IRA or the
federal regulations, concluding that the amendments were intended
to clarify the existing law and were not retroactive. 1 2 As in the Miami
federal benefits prior to the enactment of' the federal regulations and then were sub-
sequently denied the continuation of those benefits. See Greene v. Lujan, No. C89-
645Z, 1992 WL 533059, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 1992) (holding that the Samish In-
dians derived a protected property interest in their status as a tribe on the basis of past
federal benefits received by its members), affd sub nom. Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d
1266, 1275 (9th Cir. 1995). The court in Miami Nation 11 distinguished Greene on the
grounds that the Miami tribe had not been receiving federal benefits prior to their de-
nial of federal recognition. Miami Nation 11, 887 F. Supp. at 1175 n.4.
106 Miami Nation 11, 887 F. Supp. at 1173.
107 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (describing federal rulemaking procedures tinder the
Administrative Procedures Act).
10H 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2002) (providing the mandatory criteria for federal acknow-
ledgement of historic tribes).
109 Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana v. Babbitt, ("Miami Nation 111") 112 F.
St ip 2d 742, 744 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
Id. at 751.
Id. at 751-58.
112 Id. at 760.
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Nation's previous litigation efforts, the federal court ignored the sub-
stantive issues presented in favor ofjudicial deference to the DOI.
The Miami Nation attempted a variety of legal attacks on the
DOI's administration of the FAP. While each claim was grounded in a
judicially cognizable action, the Miami Nation was appealing to the
court's sense of fairness. In other words, the Miami Nation asked the
judiciary to honor the federal government's trust obligations toward
all Native Americans and restore the Miami Nation to its formally rec-
ognized status. Instead, the judiciary hid behind procedural barriers
to review and judicial deference to the DOI. In the end, the Miami
Nation was forced to "accept the procedures and obligations of the
legal system" that "'deter courts from deciding cases on the merits.......
b. The United Houma Nation
The United Houma Nation similarly attempted to challenge the
practices and procedures of the DOI in federal court. The United
Houma Nation (UHN) originally inhabited the Terrebonne and La-
fourche Parishes southwest of New Orleans, Louisiana."" Like many
nonrecognized tribes, the UHN intermarried with French Creoles and
African Americans in order to escape governmental e 15
Today, the UHN is one of the largest state-recognized tribes of Louisi-
ana.' However, despite its efforts to challenge the DOI's effective-
ness, the UHN remains federally unrecognized.
The UHN filed a Letter of Intent with the DOI in 1979 when fed-
eral petitioning began.1 7 Preliminarily denied federal acknowledg-
ment on December 22, 1994, the UHN petitioned the DOI on May 13,
1995 for a rulemaking on the theory that the criteria upon which their
petition was originally denied had become invalid under the 1994
amendments. The UHN further asked that the DOI revise the federal
regulations accordingly."" The DOI declined to engage in informal
rulemaking leading the UHN to seek a judicial declaration that the
113 GERALI) N. ROSENBERG, THE HOL.OW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 12 (1991) (quoting COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTERESTI LAW, BALANCING
THE SCALES OFJ USTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTERIEST I-w IN AMFRICA 855 (1976)).
Jordan S. Dill, Houma isto,, at http://dickshovel.com/ho.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2003).
Id.
III; Id.
117 United Hounma Nation v. Babbitt, No. Civ.A. 96-2095, 1997 WL 403425, at *1
(D.D.C.July 8, 1997).
1 d.
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current criteria, specifically the historic tribe requirement, be re-
vised."' The district court reasoned that their review of an administra-
tive agency's refusal to initiate rulemaking procedures was "'very nar-
row."" 2  Agency decisions would only be overturned "'in the rarest
and most compelling circumstances." Noting that Congress had
not directly addressed the issue of federal recognition or the regula-
tions developed by the Department, the court found "the agency's ac-
knowledgment regulations [to be] entitled to deference under Chev-
ron."122 By limiting the judiciary's ability to review the decisions of the
DOI, the court turned a blind eye to the harsh reality facing nonrec-
ognized tribes in the FAP.
c. A standard of judicial deference to the DOI
The Miami Nation and the UHN attempted a variety of legal
claims aimed atjudicial inquiry into the authority and practice of the
DOI. In both instances, the judiciary did not even attempt to inquire
into the factual and historical circumstances surrounding the Miami
Nation and UHNs current nonrecognized status. Regardless of the
substantive claim, the judiciary gave complete and total deference to
the decisions and actions of the DOI.
Given these precedents, it appears fruitless for nonrecognized
tribes to become involved in litigation. In order to avoid judicial def-
erence to the DOI, a nonrecognized tribe must prove that the DOI
has exceeded its authority by enacting rules inconsistent with its con-
gressional delegation.~1" At the same time, the DOI's congressional
authority is so broad that it is unlikely that a tribe would be able to
demonstrate such overreaching, effectively closing the door to federal
recognition litigation. 21
[d. at *2.
121 Id. at *6 (quoting Ark. Power & Light Co. v. ICC, 725 F.2d 716, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1984)).
121 Id. (quoting W. Fuels-Ill., Inc. v. ICC, 878 F.2d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 1989)).
122 Id. at *8.
123 Cf supra text accompanying notes 103-12 (reviewing the Miami Nation's tin-
successful efforLs to convince a federal district court that the DOI acted either unrea-
sonably or arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding that the Miamis were no longer a
tribal organization).
12,1 See supra note 63 (describing the breadth of the language with which Congress
delegated to the DOI the authority to review federal recognition applications).
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2. Exhaustion and PrimaryJurisdiction
Beyond extending extreme judicial deference to the DOI, courts
confronted with tribes seeking a judicial declaration of recognition
"have with high predictability invoked either exhaustion or primary
jurisdiction.,,125 The exhaustion doctrine "prevent[s] the courts...
from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over adminis-
trative policies," and also "protect[s] the agencies from judicial inter-
ference until an administrative decision has been formalized. 1 2' Is-
sues of primary jurisdiction arise "where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement
of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, uinder a regula-
tory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body."'
2 7
In the federal acknowledgement context, both exhaustion and
primary jurisdiction prevent the judiciary from considering the sub-
stantive issues brought by nonrecognized tribes prior to the time that
the DOI has come to a final resolution. These procedural barriers
thwarted the efforts of five tribes seeking federal recognition: the
James Group, the Golden Hills Paugussett Tribe, the Schagticoke
Tribe, the United Tribe of Shawnee Indian, and the Burt Lake Band
of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. The following case examples leave
little hope that the courts are willing to recognize the government's
trust obligations to Indians over the delegated power and authority of
the DOI.
a. The James Group
The seminal case involving the exhaustion doctrine in the context
of federal acknowledgment is James v. United States Department of Health
& Human Services. In James, a nonrecognized tribe, referred to as
the James Group, claimed that another faction of the same original
tribe, the Widdis Group, had fraudulently received funding from the
l12, John W. Ragsdale,Jr., The United Tribe o] Shanmee hidians: The Battle for Recogni
tion, 69 UMKC L. REV. 311, 328 (2000).
126 2 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAIAME'.RS' EDITION § 2:298 (1994); see also Rebecca L.
Donnellan, Student Work, The Exhaustion Doctrine Should Not Be a Doctyine with Excep-
tions, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 361, 366-69 (2001) (discussing the general rationale behind
exhaustion and the specific administrative and judicial interests that are served).
127 United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); se id. ("[1]n such a case
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative
body for its views.").
128 824 F.2d 1132,1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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Department of Health and Human Services. 12 The Widdis Group in-
corporated in 1972 as the Wampanoag Tribal Council (Tribal Coun-
cil) for the purpose of seeking federal recognition."" The Tribal
Council procured approximately $175,000 in grants from the De-
partment of Health and Human Services to assist it in the process."
The Tribal Council was ultimately successful in its pursuit of federal
recognition, achieving that status in 1987.13' Unlike the Tribal Coun-
cil, the James Group sought a judicial declaration that it was already
federally recognized.""" The D.C. Circuit concluded that the decision
of whether the James Group's evidence was sufficient for recognition
"should be made in the first instance by the Department of the Inte-
rior."' 4 Finding that judicial determinations of Indian status would
frustrate the congressional delegation of this authority to the DOI, '
the court declined to address the James Group's claim that it was a
federally recognized tribe. Instead, the court remanded the decision
to the DOI."':" Once again, rather than consider the substantive claims
of a nonrecognized tribe, the court deferred to the DOI.
b. The Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe
Six years later, the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians at-
tempted to recover native lands illegally purchased under the Nonin-
tercourse Act. 13 These native lands covered thousands of acres in
Fairfield and New Haven counties in Connecticut. P48 Although the
Tribe was recognized by the State of Connecticut'" the Golden Hill
were still awaiting final determination by the DOI. As in James Group,
rather than inquiring into the factual nature of the Golden Hill's
129 Id. at 1135.
13 Id. at 1134.
131 Id.
I1 Id. at 1136.
I d. at 1136-37.
134 Id. at 1137.
113 See id. (observing that the purpose of the regulatory scheme "would be frus-
trated if the Judicial Branch made initial determinations of whether groups have been
recognized previously or whether conditions for recognition currently exist").
1I: Id. at 1138-39.
137 Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130, 132 (D.
Conn. 1993).
138 Golden Hill Land Claims, Golden Hill Paugussett Nation, at http://www.
goldenhill-landclaims.itgo.com/golden hill land claims.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2003).
.39 GAM, K. SHEFFIELD, THE ARBITRARY INDIAN: THEl INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT
OF 1990, at65 (1997).
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claim, the district court held that "a litigant must exhaust all adminis-
trative remedies before seeking judicial relief."' 40 The court expressed
concern that allowing judicial review of the tribe's nonintercourse
claim under the Indian Nonintercourse Act 4' would "encourage
avoid[ance] of the DOI's processes, impede uniformity, and multiply
proceedings.'142 Citing judicial and administrative convenience rather
than concerns of fairness or justice, the court dismissed the Tribe's
nonintercourse claim until such time as the Tribe became federally
recognized.
c. The Schagticoke Tribal Nation
The Schagticoke Tribal Nation, another Connecticut tribe,
brought an action in federal court seeking to intervene in the United
States government's attempt to acquire 43.47 acres of tribal land for
the Appalachian Trail."'i This land covered the Tribe's mountainous
reservation in Kent, Connecticut.""' The Tribe filed its petition for ac-
knowledgment in 1994 while awaiting a decision from the DOI."",' The
court found that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required defer-
ence to the DOI and refused to consider the Tribe's substantive
claims."'1 The court argued that deferring the decision making to the
DOI would promote uniformity in the field of federal recognition and
would prevent judicial interference with the DOI's procedural frame-
work."' 7 The court reasoned that without such judicial deference, In-
dian petitioners would be "encouraged to flood the courts, " 148 thereby
breeding further uncertainty into the area of federal recognition.
Once again, the federal court chose the issue of DOI convenience
over the substantive claims raised by the nonrecognized tribe and
completely ignored the factual situation facing the Schagticoke Tribal
140 Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe, 839 F. Supp. at 134.
141 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
142 Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe, 839 F. Supp. at 134.
143 United States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Stipp. 2d 187, 189-90 (D. Conn.
1999).
144 See Tribal History, Schagticoke Tribal Nation, at http://www.schaghticoke.
com/sutmmary.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (describing the Schagticoke tribal base
in Kent, Connecticut).
145 See 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (describing the history of the
Tribe's filing). The Tribe was eleventh on the list in 1997. Id.
146 See id. at 194 ("[T] he balance of all the factors clearly indicates that deference
to [the BIA Branch of Acknowledgement and Research] is warranted.").
1 I d. at 192.
148 i.
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Nation. While the tribe waited for the DOI to make a decision as to its
recognized status, its land was threatened by judicial action against
which the tribe was wholly unable to protect itself. By turning a blind
eye to the plight of the Schagticoke Tribal Nation, the federal court
ensured that the Tribe would lose the last pieces of its aboriginal terri-
tory.
d. The United Tribe of Shawnee Indians
In another suit challenging a federal taking of Indian land, the
United Tribe of Shawnee Indians (UTSI) brought an action in federal
court seeking a declaration that it was a federally recognized tribe en-
titled to the land at issue.' 4 ' Although the UTSI had signed five differ-
ent treaties with the United States, the district court declined to
consider the merits of its claim and held that the suit was not ripe for
review because the DOI had not made a final determination as to the
UTSI's status.' " Specifically, the court noted that "exhaustion is re-
quired when .. a plaintiff attempts to bypass the regulatory frame-
work for establishing that an Indian group exists as an Indian tribe.'5 2
As in the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe and 43.47 Acres cases, the federal
court refused to consider the basis of the UTSI's claim, choosing in-
stead to defer to the authority of the DOI."0 The court's judicial def-
erence prevailed against the issue of honoring the promises made to
the UTSI in its five treaties with the United States.
e. The Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
Most recently, the Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indi-
ans (BLB) filed suit seeking an injunction that would direct the DOI
to place the BLB on the list of federally recognized tribes.' 54 The
149 United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 545-46 (10th
Cir. 2001).
150 Treaty with the Shawnees, May 10, 1854, 10 Stat. 1053; Treaty with the Shawn-
ees, Aug. 8, 1831, 7 Stat. 355; Treaty with the Shawnees, Nov. 7, 1825, 7 Stat. 284;
Treaty with the Wyandot, Seneca, Delaware, Shawanese, Potawtomee, Ottawa, and
Chippeway, Sept. 19, 1817, 7 Star. 160; Treaty with the Shawnees, Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat.
26; see ao Welcome, United Tribe of Shawnee Indians, at http://hone.kc.rr
.con/utosi/sindexl.htrn (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (summarizing the treaty relation-
ships between the UTSI and the United States).
United Tibe of Shawnee Indians, 253 F.3d at 545-46.
152 Id. at 550.
I5 /d. at 551.
154 Burt Lake Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 217 F. Supp. 2d 76,
77 (D.D.C. 2002) (mem.).
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BLB's aboriginal lands consist of a "series of interconnecting rivers
and lakes" around the shores of Lake Huron. 5  In 1900, the BLB's
members were forced to leave their homeland when a white "land-
owner" went around the town dousing Indian homes with kerosene. 
1
%
The BLB members argued that they were not required to undergo the
DOI's procedures because they were already federally recognized in a
number of treaties in the 1800s.151 Citing the previous decisions of
James and Shawnee, the D.C. district court granted the DOI's motion to
dismiss because the BLB had failed to exhaust administrative reme-
dies.158 The court further noted that "direct suit in federal court seek-
ing federal recognition ... is not appropriate relief.' 59 Once again,
judicial deference to the authority of the DOI prevented the court
from considering the historical and substantive nature of the BLB's
claim.
The doctrines of exhaustion, primary jurisdiction, and judicial
deference have prevented the judiciary from hearing the substantive
cries of nonrecognized tribes. By placing judicial convenience above
issues of substantive fairness, the federal judiciary has left nonrecog-
nized tribes at the mercy of the DOI. By turning a blind eye to the
struggles of nonrecognized tribes both historically and in the specific
process of the FAP, the courts have subjected nonrecognized tribes to
a system that requires tremendous amounts of time and money at
high emotional costs. By closing the door to judicial review, the fed-
eral courts have declared that old promises will not be kept.
B. Judicial Promise for Nonrecognized Tribes
Thankfully, a couple of recent judicial decisions indicate that
judicial avenues remain open to tribes seeking federal recognition
who have hit the DOI roadblock. A number of recent cases brought
by nonrecognized tribes against the DOI have shed light on the possi-
155 Colonial Point Memorial Forest and Chaboigan Nature Preserve, Little Traverse Con-
servancy, at http://www.landtrust.org/NaturePreserves/ColonialPtCulturlHistory.
htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
156 Id.
157 See Burt Lake Band, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 78 ("[BI.B] asserts that it need not un-
dergo BLA's recognition process because: 1) it was already recognized as a sovereign
Indian tribe by the United States in both the Treaty of Washington in 1846 and the
Treaty of Detroit in 1855; and 2) BIA has unreasonably delayed processing plaintiff's
application.").
158 See id. at 79 ("[F]ederal recognition does not allow an entity to completel y by-
pass the BIA's recognition process.").
159 Id.
2003] 1853
1854 UNIVERSITY OFPENTNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 151:1827
bility ofjudicial intervention in the federal acknowledgement process,
bringing new hope to nonrecognized tribes and their advocates. As
was discussed in Part I.A, the DOI is required to decide the status of
an Indian tribe's petition within one year of its eligibility for active
consideration. "10 Unfortunately, the DOI rarely makes a decision
within a year, causing delay in the tribes' other legal actions and/or
continued denial of federal benefits. In 2000 and 2001, the Muwekma
Tribe and the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council brought success-
ful mandamus claims against the DOI requesting that the DOI com-
plete its review of their petitions in accordance with its regulations.''
Unlike the previous cases by nonrecognized litigants, the court fo-
cused on the emotional, legal, and economic costs associated with the
delay of federal recognition rather than deferring to the DOI's deci-
sion-making authority. As a result, the courts now appear to have
turned the corner of assuring that old promises will be kept to non-
recognized tribes.
1. The Muwekma Tribe
The Muwekma Tribe of the San Francisco Bay area entered the
federal acknowledgment process in 1989. "2 After filing its petition in
1995 and supplying the DOI with further documentation upon re-
quest, the Muwekma qualified for active consideration in March
1998. "1"' The Tribe brought a legal action in the D.C. district court,
asking the court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the DOI to
complete its review of the tribe's petition within twelve months.'"
Looking to the Administrative Procedure Act, the court found that
agencies are required "within a reasonable time" to "proceed to con-
clude a matter presented to it. '" " ' If an agency does not proceed
within a reasonable time, the APA "confers upon the courts authority
to 'compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
P For a discussion of the actual time taken by the DOI to decide petitions, see
sufta note 69 and accompanying text.
Other Indian tribes have successfully avoided the confines of the exhaustion
doctrine by claiming that the DOI unreasonably delayed its responsibilities to the
tribes. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that
the DOI's mismanagement of Indian trust accounts constituted unreasonable delay
warranting equitable remedy by the court).
162 Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt ("Muwekma I"), 133 F. Stipp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C.
2000).
1. at 33.
id. at 31.
1115 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2000).
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layed. ' ""' Claims of unreasonable delay are traditional exceptions to
the exhaustion doctrine,' 7 allowing courts to analyze whether the
matter requires judicial action.
In assessing claims of unreasonable delay, the district court turned
to the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Telecommunications Research & Action
Center v. FCC (TRAC). 18 The court in TRAC developed useful guide-
lines for determining when an administrative "agency's delay is so
egregious as to warrant [a writ of] mandamus."" '1 TRAC directs the
trial court to consider whether, among other factors, the agency has
followed a rule of reason and its enabling statute's timetable for deci-
sion making. In assessing agency action, the court should apply
stricter judicial scrutiny in matters of human health and welfare, en-
sure that agency action does not interfere with matters of higher or
competing authority, and pay careful attention to the type of interest
prejudiced by delay." 0 If the agency delay is chronic, it results in "'a
denial of justice,""171 justifying the federal court's use of its equitable
authority. 72 Applying the TRAC guidelines, the district court found
the DOI's two-year delay in processing the Muwekma's petition unrea-
sonable and ordered the Department to submit a proposed schedule
for resolving the issue.)7
In 2000, the district court denied the DOI's motion to dismiss the
Muwekma litigation. 71 When the DOI returned to court one year later
with only a proposed timeframe for placing the Muwekma Tribe on
the active consideration list, the court found the proposed remedy
unacceptable.'7 5 The district court stated that its earlier ruling was in-
16 Muwekma 1, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (quoting the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000)).
167 Id. at 34.
168 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
I d. at 79.
170 Id. at 80.
171 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting
Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
172 SeeCobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that the dis-
trict court "acted well within its broad equitable powers in ordering specific relief"
against the Secretaries of the Interior and Treasury in litigation involving Individual
Indian Money trust accounts, and concluding that "' [i] f a right of action exists to en-
force a federal right and Congress is silent on the question of remedies, a federal court
may order any appropriate relief' (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503
U.S. 60, 69 (1992)).
173 Muwekma 1, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
174 Id. at 42.
175 Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt ("Muwekma It'), 133 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51 (D.D.C.
2001).
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tended to "rectify the past delay," and not to allow the DOI "to proceed
on an already delayed course of action. '17'7 The court demanded that
the DOI make a final determination on the Muwekma Tribe's petition
by March 11, 2002.177 Although the DOI struggled to comply with the
court's ruling, the court flatly refused to grant the DOI's subsequent
request to vacate the deadline.)1
2. The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council
The court also recognized the material consequences of the DOI's
tribal recognition procedures in the case of the Mashpee Wampanoag
Tribal Council (MWTC). A year after the conclusion of the Muwekma
case, the MWTC filed a similar claim in the same court, asserting un-
reasonable delay by the DOI in processing its petition. 79 At the time it
filed suit, the MW'TC was third on the list of petitions ready for con-
sideration; however, it had languished there for more than five
years.'" Applying the TRAC factors used in Muwekma, the court con-
cluded that the DOI had unreasonably delayed the MWTC's petition
and required the Department to issue a final decision within twelve
months of the court's December 2001 ruling.
8'
The court also intended that its decision would significantly affect
the Department's FAP. Recognizing the hardships faced by nonrec-
ognized tribes, the court noted that
[a] more hopeful scenario, however, is that BIA will be moved by these
two orders, or by an accumulation of them, to reallocate its resources, or
streamline its decisionmaking process, or contract out some of the work
that needs to be done on a petition for acknowledgment, or seek addi-
tional revenues from Congress for that task, or do any of the many other
things that agencies can do when they must.
Rather than defer to the DOI's timetable, the court examined the
reality faced by nonrecognized tribes in the FAP. Instead of turning a
blind eye to their plight, the court specifically noted the human costs
176 1d.
177 Id.
178 Muwekma Tribe v. Norton ("Muwekma III"), 206 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.
2002).
79 Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 180 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132
(D.D.C. 2001).
1801 /d. at 133.
181 /d. at 137.
182 /d. at 136.
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associated with the DOI's delay.'811 While the judiciary still recognized
and honored the DOI's authority to decide the ultimate issue of fed-
eral recognition,""' when confronted with the tension between proce-
dural and substantive fairness, the court chose the latter.
1V. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL RECOGNITION LITIGATION
The recent decisions regarding the Muwekma and MWTC provide
new hope for nonrecognized tribes seeking judicial assistance in their
struggle for federal recognition. Although judicial precedent once
suggested that nonrecognized tribes and their advocates should avoid
the costly alternative of litigation, Muwekma and Mashpee suggest oth-
erwise. When considering whether or not to bring.judicial action, ad-
vocates for nonrecognized tribes should also consider the extrajudi-
cial effects and congressional interest created by the Muwekma and
Mashpee decisions.
A. Extrajudicial Effects
Successful lawsuits provide advantages and rewards that exceed
the sum of legal and equitable relief. These extrajudicial effects grant
plaintiffs greater power in structuring dealings and negotiations with
their opponents outside the courtroom.
1. RetainingJurisdiction, Repeat Players, and Shaming
The first extrajudicial effect provided by the current tribal recog-
nition litigation results from the court's decision to retain jurisdiction.
By forcing the DOI to remain accountable to the district court, the ju-
diciary interferes with the Department's ability to become an "en-
trenched bureaucracy," accountable to no one.' 5 When jurisdiction is
retained and DOI officials are required to submit proposals and make
final determinations within a particular timeframe, the DOI does not
have the ability to ignore court orders.
183 See id. at 135 (noting the tribe's uncontested assertion that "the delay in proc-
essing their petition directly affects the rights, health, and welfare of the Tribe and its
members").
184 See id. at 132 ("The authority to determine the eligibility of tribes for federal
recognition is assigned to the BIA.").
See ROSENBERG, supra note 113, at 23 (discussing "entrenched bureaucracies" as
"self-perpetuating, self-sufficient bureaus which are power sources unto themselves").
18572003]
1858 UNIVERSITY OF PENNS YL VANIA LA W REVIEIW [Vol. 151:1827
It is also significant that the District of Columbia federal courts
have required the DOI to meet its obligations to Indian tribes.8t The
DOI is a "repeat player"5 7 in the D.C. Circuit and therefore has an in-
centive to comply with the court's ruling... s The next time the De-
partment is before the court on another matter may be within weeks
of the original decision, rather than years in other federal jurisdic-
tions.
Given the proximity and relationship between governmental
agencies and the D.C. Circuit, the DOI is more vulnerable to the
court's discussion of their behavior. Professors Edward Rock and
David Skeel have noted the use of shaming in Delaware fiduciary law
to enforce norms of appropriate corporate behavior."" ' Likewise, in
the context of administrative law, judicial censure by D.C. federal
courts affects the attitude and vigor with which the Department ap-
plies the United States' fiduciary duty to Native Americans.
2. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law
Scholars have noted the use of judicial decisions as "bargaining
chips" in dealings between parties outside of the courtroom.' ' Once
nonrecognized tribes have won in court, the rights vindicated by liti-
gation become the "possessions of the dispossessed"' " tribe to use in
negotiations with the DOI. As Professor Michael McCann has noted,
'judicial proclamations are likely to have less impact in altering the
186 See supra Part III.B (considering the success of the Muwekma and Mashpee litiga-
tion).
87 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculation About the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 lAW & SOc'Y REv. 95, 97 (1974) (defining repeat players as parties
"who are engaged in many similar litigations over time").
See id. at 99-101 (noting that preserving a repeat player's "bargaining reputa-
tion" that she obeys the rules is more important than winning or losing any individual
case).
8 See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1106 (1997) (concluding that Delaware fiduciary law functions
"as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad managers and directors" constraining
fiduciaries' duties to the corporation); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1811-13 (2001) (arguing that the importance of one's reputa-
tion in the corporate context renders shaming an effective method of distinguishing
impermissible from permissible behavior).
190 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (observing that "the outcome that the
law will impose if no agreement is needed" provides a powerful incentive for extrajudi-
cial resolution of disputes).
191 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 310 (1990).
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substantive values of most citizens... than in reshaping perceptions
of when and how particular values are realistically actionable as claims
of legal right.'9 2 In the wake of Muwekma and Mashpee, nonrecog-
nized tribes who have submitted their documentation have the power
to force the DOI to meet their obligations, and can use their viable
litigation option as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the DOI.
Appreciating this "constitutive capacity of law""" permits a deeper
understanding of the impact of judicial decisions. When assessing the
weight and effect of judicial measures, it is important to consider not
only whether a particular party won or lost, but how other similarly
situated actors may appropriate the judicial decision to their benefit.
B. The Impact of the Muwekma and Mashpee Litigation
Though it is difficult to measure the impact of the Muwekma and
Mashpee decisions on the field of federal Indian recognition, there is
some indication that the DOI is experiencing the consequences. One
indication is the Department's unsuccessful appeal for deadline ex-
tensions in Muwekma I.114 Arguably, if the Department had the capa-
bility to fulfill its fiduciary obligation to the nonrecognized tribes, it
likely would have done so. The Department has been unable to meet
1his obligation, however, and instead may now have to pursue bureau-
cratic reorganization. In fact, the Department may be so incapable of
deciding recognition petitions within twelve months that it would be
willing to forfeit this responsibility altogether.
Since 1992, the Native American Oversight Committees of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate have discussed transfer-
ring the federal acknowledgment process from the DOI to a separate
congressional commission.' 5" In 1994, Congressman Craig Thomas
from Wyoming introduced H.R. 4462, which would establish a "Com-
mission on Indian Recognition" to oversee the acknowledgment proc-
ess.' 19 Expressing confidence that problems in the federal recognition
process could be resolved by the DOI, officials vehemently opposed
192 Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Tial, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 715, 732
(1993).
193 Id. at 733.
194 Supra note 178 and accompanying text.
95 See Hearing on H.R. 3430, supra note 26, at 58 (statement of HenryJ. Sockbeson,
Attorney, Native American Rights Fund) (suggesting that the recognition process "be
taken out of [DOI]" and transferred to Congress).
196 Hearing on Federal Regulation of Indian 'ribes, supra note 73, at 78-79 (statement
of Rep. Craig Thomas, Member, House Comm. on Natural Res.).
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the removal of the FAP from the Department's jurisdiction.' ;7 How-
ever, in 2000, the DOI suddenly admitted its incapacity to efficiently
decide nonrecognized tribes' petitions. 19 During the hearings, the
Department's representative, Kevin Gover, testified that "even after
our best efforts ... we are not going to be able to do better than we
have for the last few years."''" Gover feared that federal recognition
would "never become a priority of any future Administration ',20 lead-
ing him to "encourage the [C]ommittee to mark up [the] bill and
work on it."'2"' The Department's change of heart arguably might be
the result of congressional pressure, but this does not entirely account
for the change, particularly since the process has been subject to con-
gressional oversight since its inception. More likely, however, the
combination of congressional pressure and federal recognition litiga-
tion encouraged the DOI to honestly evaluate its limitations.
CONCLUSION
Nonrecognized tribes entered the litigation process hopeful that
the federal judiciary would look past matters of formal legalism to
help remedy the struggles Indians face to achieve recognition through
the FAP. In the majority of judicial decisions, the courts proved un-
willing or incapable of honoring the historical promises made to non-
recognized tribes. Recent decisions, however, suggest that the litiga-
tion efforts of nonrecognized tribes may not have been in vain. The
successful mandamus actions of the Muwekma and Mashpee Tribes
provide new promise for nonrecognized tribes' dreams of inclusion in
the recognized Indian community.
197 See id. at 107 (statement of Patrick A. Hayes, Acting Deputy Commn'r of Indian
Affairs, United States Dept of the Interior) (opposing H.R. 4462 because of the De-
partment's particular expertise in Indian Affairs and his confidence that recent regula-
tions would solve prior difficulties).
198 See Federal Recog-nition: Heming on S. 611 to Provide for Administrative Procedures to
Extend Federal Recognition to Certain Indian Groups, 106th Cong. 54-55 (2000) (statement
of Kevin Gover, Assistant Sec'y of Indian Affairs, United States Dep't of the Interior)
(stating that the DOI has made insufficient progress in processing recognition applica-
tions).
199 /d. at 54.
NO Id.
20 /~d. at 55.
